Category: South Asia

Politics over Hijab in Karnataka: a Precursor to State Elections 2023

This weekly briefing is being published in retrospect due to the CCRJ solidarity with the 2022 University Staff Strike.

The Hindu nationalist movement (popularly known as Hindutva) is known for its conservative position and Hindu supremacist ideology. Since 2014, the Bharatiya Janata Party-led (BJP) government has been the political force translating the ideology into policies and governance. It has once again flared up controversy by pursuing policies that target religious minorities in India. One instance of this is the number of institutions in the state of Karnataka which are witnessing protests predominantly led by upper-caste Hindu students against their Muslim peers wearing hijab in class. 

In January 2022, six female students in the Udupi district were denied access to their college campus for donning the hijab. Since then the state, with a BJP government at the helm, has witnessed similar incidents where students wearing hijabs were not allowed to enter their institution’s premises. In some cases, radical Hindu organizations mobilized Hindu students to protest against their Muslim peers by wearing saffron scarves, claiming that there was no equality in allowing religious clothing in “secular educational” spaces. There are video reports of saffron-clad men heckling women wearing hijab and burqa.

A Muslim girl student filed a writ petition in the Karnataka High Court against institutions claiming that Article 14 and 25 of the Indian Constitution guarantees theirright to practice their religion and should protect them from discrimination. The State Government shutdown  colleges for three days until the High Court announced its decision on the matter, but the High Court has only passed an interim order so far, to prevent students from wearing any religious clothing until the final order is out. This order has established a false equivalence between hijab and saffron scarves: unlike the hijab, worn by only some Muslim women as part of their religious expression, the purpose of saffron scarves has been to intimidate Muslim women. 

Any observer of Indian politics would not find it surprising that a communal issue on religious lines has been instigated in a state with upcoming polls. Karnataka will be due for its Legislative Assembly elections in May 2023 and will be one of the few states where the Prime Minister’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)  will be in direct competition with its principal national opposition, the Indian National Congress (INC). The last elections to the house in 2018 resulted in a hung assembly with BJP winning more seats despite INC winning the popular vote. 

BJP has been known to instigate communal issues in poll-bound states and foster a polarised atmosphere to score electoral points and support. In 2021, civic bodies in Gujarat state, where elections will be taking place in December 2022, announced regulations against the sale of non-vegetarian food in public spaces. The Delhi riots in 2020 and the demonization of Shaheen Bagh protestors (which was led by Muslim women in the Delhi neighbourhood) occuredjust before the Delhi elections in May 2020. A similar attempt was made to demonise farmers’ protests as a Khalistani plot in January 2021 as the year-long movement was led by farmers from Punjab and Haryana, states with significant sikh populations. But the government had to concede as Punjab is due for polls in February 2022. 

It is a recurring strategy and somewhat tired script of Hindu nationalists to target religious minorities and impose hypocritical standards.  Despite empty political declarations to the contrary, the promise of secularism has always been in contradiction to the Hindutva project. Hindu nationalists, led by the BJP, argue that secularism is a tool of appeasement for minorities which is why there has been a systematic attempt at subverting the constitutional promise of equality. 

Prime Minister Modi, a member of the BJP, promised an “inclusive India” after winning his second term in 2019 but his party has continued to engage in communally polarising election strategies across the country. This controversy over hijabs has created tensions and division among students who were previously studying together, disrupted Muslim female students from accessing their educational institutions ahead of their final exams and set a disturbing precedent of religious discrimination. It is imperative that Mr Modi intervenes and reassures his commitment to his promise. 

Image Credit: Anushree Fadnavis/Reuters

Policy Brief Issue 5: December 2021

SECTARIANISM IN PAKISTAN: COUNTERACTING RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM

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State Incompetence or State complicity? Why the Hazaras are still persecuted in Quetta.

The Hazaras have yet again experienced another major death toll to their community from the most recent attack in January which was met with a protest that lasted six days in Quetta, the capital of Balochistan. It is no surprise that the state of Pakistan has been ineffective in terms of protecting its minorities. What is the next step for the Hazara community? The Prime Minister Imran Khan himself vowed to visit Quetta as soon as the bodies were laid to rest. It’s the same story as last time: an attacks targets the Hazara community, the Hazara community refuses to bury the bodies, state officials arrive and make promises, but attacks go on.

The Hazaras refuse to bury the victims in order to make their protest heard. State authorities in Pakistan are held under pressure and there’s less chance that the atrocity will be swept underneath the carpet. It seems as if Abdur Rahman Khan’s ethnic cleansing campaign from the 19th century is still following the Hazaras from Afghanistan all the way to Quetta. The Hazaras adhere to the Shia school of Islam. The militants targeting the Hazaras are extremist groups seeking to exterminate Shias from the state of Pakistan. Is this simply sectarian violence? Or is this story missing a key perspective that allows us to make an impartial judgement to understand why Pakistan is incapable of protecting the Hazaras?

The militias involved in attacking the Hazara community have historically been strategic assets to the Pakistani state itself in terms of preserving Pakistan’s geopolitical interests in the region. Originally these militants served Pakistan’s interests for Afghan Jihad in the 1970s and 1980s. Returning from defeating the Soviets, these militants formed other jihadists groups that later became known as anti-Shia outfits ‘Sipah-e-Sahaba’ (SSP) and ‘Lashkar e Jhangvi’ (LEJ). However, this most recent attack was carried out by ISIS, which scares the authorities of Pakistan with the possible rise of ISIS within Pakistan. It also suggests that all jihadist movements share similar ideologies, reflecting anti-Shiite ambitions. Since 2004 over 2000 Pakistani Hazaras have been killed. Over 4000 Pakistani Shias have been killed in Pakistan due to sectarian attacks since the 1990s. 

There seems to be a hesitancy within the justice system in Pakistan to convict those arrested for the killings of Hazaras. Ex-operational chief of the LEJ was acquitted for the alleged involvement in about 44 incidents of violence that involved the killings of 70 people. Shocking as it is, the ex-chief was so confident about sharing his involvement in the killing of 100 people that he openly confessed to an Urdu newspaper in 1997. It seems as if sectarian jihadists have been awarded a green light for mass killings as part of a culture of impunity. 

The lives of the Hazaras within Quetta are indefinitely limited to the neighbourhoods of Marriabad and Hazara Town. This particular area is highly securitised and protected by military checkpoints. The hostile living conditions have only contributed to the economic hardship and limited freedom of movement. This explains why Quetta is becoming less and less a home for Hazaras, as the events of January 2021 reflect the ineffectiveness of the state apparatus to deal with the security of such deprived ethnic minorities. 

The Hazaras are an easy target for the anti-Shia militias due to their distinct facial features. Coming back to the point about jihadist movements, the Pakistan Taliban were easy recruits for the these militias as most Taliban members shared their extremist ideology. It is no secret that the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies share a mutually beneficial relationship with the Taliban which explains how such outfits banned by the military are still able to operate with impunity even in areas where state authority is well-established, such as the Punjab province and the port city of Karachi. 

Further bad news for the Hazara community, they have become the victim of the Saudi-Iranian proxy warfare. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia have used Pakistan to marginalize each other’s influence within the state and have backed militant groups to serve their interests. Post the Iranian revolution, in order to counter state influence, religion was used as a tactic to maintain control in the region and the Hazaras like other communities in Pakistan got caught in the cross-fire. Pakistan needs to recognise its ethnic minorities. The Hazaras like other communities have served the interests of the state. Now the state needs to be held accountable for the rise of sectarianism that has led to the deprivation and ethnic cleansing of communities like the Hazaras. Some notables from the Hazara community include many sportsmen and women as well as members of the military personnel and a number of politicians who have called for the conviction of criminals who have persecuted the community and continue to roam freely. 

Returning to my opening question, the next step for the Hazaras is the guarantee of effective security provisions that protect the Hazaras from any threat of persecution. The solution to the persecution of the Hazaras is not to ban all bus routes to Iran but rather to crackdown on the sectarian outfits that target them. Just by encountering one leader of one of these militias does not prevent mass violence from occurring next time. Law-enforcement agencies need to start doing their job, and the military needs to set some ground rules with the Jihadists.

World’s most populous Democracy now only ‘partly free’

As the world is trying to cope with the COVID-19 pandemic, democracy is facing a worldwide recession and the international balance is shifting “in favour of tyranny”. Less than 20% of the world now lives in ‘free’ countries, according to the annual Freedom in the World report published a week ago by the US government-funded non-profit organisation Freedom House. India, the world’s most populous democracy, has lost its status as a ‘free’ country and has transitioned to a new category recognising the state as ‘partly free’. The report warns that India’s change of status could have further damaging effects on democratic standards worldwide.

Why has India’s status changed?

Since Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power in 2014, the country has faced a decline of civil liberties and political rights, which is only continuing since Modi’s re-election in 2019. Furthermore, discrimination against minority groups, pressure on human rights organisations, and the rise of Hindu nationalism have increased. In particular, the enactment of the Citizenship Amendment Act in 2019, which made religion a criterion for Indian citizenship, exacerbated Islamophobia in India and led to protests which have been cracked down by the government. The amendment offers illegal migrants from three neighbouring countries eligibility for Indian citizenship, but not Muslim migrants. 

The outbreak of COVID-19 has not stopped these developments. Millions of migrant workers in India have been displaced due to India’s “ham-fisted lockdown”, which was introduced suddenly in March 2020, to the immediate disadvantage of already vulnerable populations. At the same time, the government encouraged the “scapegoating of Muslims”, accused of being responsible for the spread of the virus. Through the Twitter campaign #coronajihad, anti-Muslim sentiment had been expressed to further polarise public opinion (Check out Nishaan Sengupta’s article Rise of Islamophobia in India for more insights). 

Why does it matter?

During a year marked by a pandemic and various restrictions worldwide, it might seem obvious that the global trend of freedom is on a decline. However, 2020 has rather highlighted existing weaknesses of democracies and made it even more pressing to reconsider our label for states as democracies. Freedom House’s change of India’s status to ‘partly free’ sheds light on the on-going discrimination and human rights violations, which too often have been obscured by the country’s title of the ‘largest democracy in the world’. At the same time, the global downward trend towards authoritarian norms calls for more democratic advocates with allies around the world. By changing India’s title to ‘partly free’, it becomes more obvious that one important ally might be lost, since political freedom as a fundamental norm of democracy is not guaranteed anymore in the country. With China’s increasing “malign influence” in promoting disinformation and censorship and the US’s democratic decline during the Trump Administration, the global negative trend of political freedom for 15 consecutive years is no surprise – nor is India’s new status as ‘partly-free’. However, it should be regarded as a wake-up call to acknowledge that democracy is neither given nor predictable. In a period where political freedom has been downgraded in 73 countries, representing 75% of the world’s population, the need to safeguard democracy is more pressing than ever. Ultimately, it must be recognised that India’s new status could not only have further damaging effects on democratic standards worldwide but that it is representing an already on-going global trend.

Islamophobia and the British Pakistani community

The July 2007 bombings in London brought home the global dynamics produced by 9/11 and had profoundly negative repercussions for the British Pakistani population – affecting its own behaviour and its portrayal by many quarters of British society.

The fact that three of the four 7/7 terrorists were British Pakistanis, increased scrutiny of the version of Islam practised by this community, which was widely seen as illiberal towards Western societies. As a British Pakistani, growing up in the UK, I have witnessed firsthand the impact of Islamophobia in this community.  

The 2001 UK census revealed that 1.6 million British Muslims are from South Asia, with two-thirds from Pakistan. The growth of the Pakistani population dates from the post-war immigration of South Asians who arrived to fill specific labour shortages in declining industrial sectors. Today, Pakistanis continue to live excluded lives, existing near or at the bottom of local area economic and social contexts, largely in post-industrial cities to the North, Midlands and the South.

In order to understand Islamophobia in the context of British Pakistanis, it is important to understand Pakistani culture and what implications this identity has upon Pakistanis in the west. Pakistan is an Islamic republic that had experienced a statewide Islamization process in the 1970’s which was led by ex military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq. The military rule had created Islamic laws pertaining to ‘Islamic punishments’ for selected crimes and had introduced sharia courts within Pakistani society, pushing the state into the direction towards making Pakistan a real Islamic state. These laws restricted women’s rights, while also introducing Madrassa (seminary) and Mullah (cleric) culture. Zia had essentially promoted the ‘orthodox fundamentalist interpretation of Islam’ and turned religion into an ‘idiom of morality’. Hence religion had become an essential component of Pakistani culture.

Essentially, the consequences of these policies were that Pakistani citizens were forced to publicly display their religious affiliations through symbolic practices of wearing turbans, beards and hijabs and offering prayers publicly. Such symbolic traditions practiced by Pakistanis in the west were met with criticism as they resembled the practices of the terrorists involved in attacks such as those on 7/7. Questions raised included ‘is the Pakistani-Muslim identity synonymous with radical Islam?’. What was supposed to be the implementation of Islamic laws by Zia, turned into a complex discourse impacting the politics, cultural practices and perceptions of Pakistani citizens including in the diaspora.

The British media has also played a centric role in this debate, embedding negative stereotypes of Islam and Muslims in the wider society. Constant coverage of extremist groups and Islamic terrorism has propagated the idea of the Muslim community as a threat. This focus on the ‘War on Terror’ has caused many non-Muslims to question Muslims’ loyalty to Britain. An example of the role of the media in context of the Pakistani community would be the coverage of the foiled terrorist plot of August 2006. As the majority of the arrests were from the British Pakistani community, within hours of the arrests, high profile policing figures were airing concerns in relation to the ‘‘biggest terrorist event since 9/11’. By tying terrorism with the British Pakistani population, many Britons have been left frightened by the information they have come across about the Islamic background of Pakistani Muslims. 

As a British Pakistani Muslim, I feel as if we are moving towards people from this community having to distant themselves from their religio-cultural beliefs in order to survive in a ‘Multicultural’ society.

Violence and Dissent in Modi’s India

2014 was a turning point for India. The year marked Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s election victory. The BJP government not only won, but also dominated the election by winning with a majority–the first of this kind of majority in twenty years. Though the election was won on the promises of development, the creation of different employment opportunities, and agricultural reforms, the BJP-led government has failed at keeping these promises.

Instead of the creation of a better society, the country has witnessed a rise in intolerance towards minorities, increased violence, and suppression of any form of dissent against the party in power. Furthermore, the conflict within Kashmir has further deteriorated under Modi’s rule, with an increase in civilian as well as military officials’ deaths.

In Modi’s India, questioning the state has led to online trolling, arrests, and even killings of those who dare to publicly voice their dissent against the government. The Bhima Koregoan commemoration emphasizes the silencing of dissent and violence in Modi’s India and demonstrates why the Modi government is a threat to the diversity and democracy in India.

In order to shed light on the recent atrocities being committed by the government, the SOAS India Society organized an panel titled, ‘Violence and Dissent in Modi’s India,’ to discuss the violence surrounding the Bhima Koregoan case. On New Year’s Eve, 2017, thousands of lower-caste Hindus–who are known as Dalits–gathered at the Bhima Koregoan war memorial to commemorate the 200th anniversary of the Anglo-Maratha war.

The commemoration is significant; it was organized to pay respects to the fighters of the Mahar regiment who fought against the upper-caste regiment and won the battle. Though the commemoration was a peaceful celebration, it soon turned violent when the attendees were attacked by upper-caste Maratha groups. Following the violence, instead of the arrests of those who incited the violence, local police arrested various activists and attendees.

Though the violence was only perpetrated against harmless attendees, it was followed by nation-wide harassment and the arrests of scholars and activists who publicly spoke against the crushing of dissent and curbing of freedom of speech in Modi’s India.

The panel at Violence and Dissent in Modi’s India consisted of three panellists who explored on the violence surrounding the Bhima Koregoan case. The first speaker, Dr Mayur Suresh, is a lecturer in Law at SOAS, University of London. Due to his law background, Dr Suresh focused on the law under which those arrested in the Bhima Koregaon case were charged by the police: the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA). Put into effect following the second emergency period in India (1967), UAPA was enacted as a response to two separatist campaigns.

A recent amendment was made to the law in 2002, which expanded UAPA to include POTA (Prevention of Terrorism Act). Hence, with the introduction of this act, the events of Bhima Koregaon or lower-caste assertion were being linked to terrorism. This is evident as the first information report (FIR) filed by the upper-caste Maratha group,s who attacked the attendees of the Bhima Koregoan commemoration event, emphasized the violence as a response to the speeches being made at the event.

The law is highly problematic as it enables the state to arrest the accused for a time period of six months of longer without providing the accused with the relevant information about the charges for which they are being convicted.

Furthermore, arrestees cannot attain the granting of bail. Not only does this law act as a threat to freedom of speech, it also enables the state to practice draconian laws and arrest any individual they view as a threat without substantial evidence. Dr Suresh highlighted how the law is a key tool used by the state to curb dissent.

The second speaker, advocate Susan Abraham, is a lawyer and human rights activist. She emphasizes how the violence that was unleashed on the attendees on 1 January led to a greater movement of people from the Dalit community, who came together for a state-wide strike in protest of the violence perpetrated by Hindutva groups. No action was taken, nor was any judgement passed in January.

Following the violence that occurred during the Bhima Koregoan commemoration, months later on 6June, the government of Maharashtra issued the arrests of prominent scholars and activists related to the Bhima Koregaon commemoration violence, including Rona Wilson, Sudhir Dhawale, Mahesh Raut, Surendra Gadling, and Shoma Sen. They were arrested, with terrorism related charges, under UAPA five months after the event. In addition to the brutality unleashed by the state by imposing this law, the five individuals were arrested on the premise that they were plotting collectively to assassinate Prime Minister Modi. During the arrests, not only were they assaulted by the police, but their laptops and documents were seized.

Despite wide-scale protests domestically and on an international level, the government refused to allow bail for the activists involved and declared war on “urban naxals.” This term is used to label those who dissent against the government in power and the enemies within India who “act as a threat to the integrity and unity of the country.” Following a second round of arrests and raids by the police, on 28 August 2018, Dr. Abraham’s own house was raided by the authorities and her husband Vernon Gonsalves was arrested.  

The third speaker, Professor Romila Thapar, is a renowned historian and professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) in New Delhi. In a recorded video, Professor Thapar emphasized the role of government in changing the content of school textbooks in order to glorify the role of Hindus in Indian history. In history textbooks across Maharashtra and Rajasthan, the role of Mughals and Muslim rulers is being erased and replaced with the accomplishments of Hindu Maratha and Rajput rulers.

She stressed the silencing of dissent with a clear focus on university campuses, noting how dissent is met with violence. She highlighted how fear is being spread specifically within universities by Hindutva forces, who perpetrate violence with impunity.

Professor Thapar’s contribution is important as it highlights how the education sector is being widely targeted by the Modi government to suit their interests and to magnify the role of Hindus. This deliberate rewriting of history according to the interests of the ruling party is a threat to the learning process of students who are forced to learn a distorted version of history.

The election of Narendra Modi has not only led to an increase in hate crimes against minorities and lower-caste Hindus, but also in the legitimization of violence without any repercussions. Dr Suresh, Advocate Abraham, and Professor Thapar provide different reasoning for why the Modi government is a threat to the unity of the country. Laws such as UAPA, arrests of activists for voicing their dissent, and the changing of school textbooks are systematically employed by the Modi government to crush dissent.  The violence at the Bhima Koregaon commemoration is a clear example of the rise of the Hindutva groups and the rise of politics of repression in all forms, ranging from the public sphere to even a private declaration of dissent against the state. Minority groups, students, scholars, and activists are under a clear threat.

The attacks on university campuses and changing of school textbooks are a clear reflection of this. Any form of dissent is met with abuse, arrests and even deaths of those who publicly oppose the government in power. The curbing of dissent has taken various forms and the application of laws, such as UAPA, which entails a form of institutionalized discrimination and violence.

Hence, the targeting of minorities and suppression of dissent isn’t just a threat to the well-being of the citizens of India, but also a threat to our constitution, which allows all citizens of India with the right to question authority, dissent, and requires tolerance of the diverse groups living in our nation.

The four pillars of democracy–the Executive, Judiciary, Legislature, and Media–are constantly being used by the government to silence any form of dissent. Not only has the Prime Minister failed to fulfill the promises on the basis of which he was elected in 2014, but his government has become the root cause of the growing intolerance and rise in communal violence across India.

Unfortunately, in Modi’s India, being critical of the Prime Minister is conflated with being an enemy of India. Therefore, in light of the escalating tensions with Pakistan, the conflict in Kashmir and the upcoming Lok Sabha elections, it is important now more than ever to come together as a secular and democratic nation to fight against intolerance, hate, and prejudices, collectively. The upcoming elections are the only chance for the citizens of India to come together and use the power of the ballot to vote this hateful, intolerant, and fascist government out of power and save our democracy.

Further Reading:  

1. Shantha, Sukanya. (2018), ‘The People’s Fighters: Meet the Five Arrested in the Bhima Koregoan Case’. The Wire. Available from: https://thewire.in/caste/meet-the-five-arrested-in-the-bhima-koregaon-case

2. Torgalkaer, Varsha. (2018), ‘One Killed in Clashes at Bhima Koregoan Battle Anniversary Event in Pune; Situation Tense in Maharashtra’. The Wire. Available from: https://thewire.in/caste/one-killed-clashes-bhima-koregaon-battle-anniversary-event-pune

3. The Wire Staff. (2018), ‘In Nationwide Swoop, Five Rights Activists Arrested, Several More Raided’. The Wire. Available from: https://thewire.in/rights/police-take-sudha-bharadwaj-into-custody-raid-homes-of-lawyers-activists-across-cities

Image Credit: Frederick Noronha