How Social Media Fuels the Iranian Protests

Iran has seen major waves of resistance in the form of protests in 1999, 2009, 2017, 2019 and 2021; what separates the 2022 protests from protests before? All preceding protests reveal an underlying legitimacy crisis for the regime where the population have called for regime change. These protests share common themes of widespread dissatisfaction with the regime and its exclusionary policies towards women and other minority groups. However, the protests sparked by Amini’s death have transcended sectarian and ethnic differences, and the role of social media has differentiated the 2022 protests in terms of reach. Amini’s death has sparked global outrage across the country with individuals in adjacent countries and the West demonstrating support for Iranian protests by burning their hijabs and cutting their hair. The impact of social media has meant that protestors have been able to share videos of severe uses of force by the Iranian police and protests in real-time using the hashtag #Mahsa_Amini

The death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini has sparked protests against the current regime in Iran throughout all 31 provinces in the country and across the world. Amini’s death followed after being arrested for protesting the compulsory headscarf rules, resulting in her death. The Iranian police claim her death was a result of heart issues, however, public opinion rejects these claims as eyewitnesses have come forward with allegations that Amini was severely beaten by police officers almost immediately after her arrest. The police tried to dispel these allegations with reportedly heavily edited CCTV footage showing Amini holding her head and subsequently fainting whilst in police custody – this has sparked further outrage across the country. Several factors have been attributed to the protests in Iran, and scholars and journalists have highlighted the general dissolution of Khamenei’s regime, the contention of Islamic law, and women’s rights. Social media, albeit underappreciated, is a major factor driving the current wave of Iranian protests and is essential to comprehending both their effectiveness and the broad indignation over Amini’s death.

The outrage sparked by Amini’s death is far-reaching and pervasive. Cities like Mashhad and Qom, previously considered loyal to the regime, are protesting against the state. Despite state-sanctioned restrictions on the internet and apps such as WhatsApp and Instagram, the videos of protests and police killings have dispensed the spirit of resistance to areas that have previously been key strongholds of the regime in terms of public opinion and therefore upholding the regime’s legitimacy. The impacts of social media on the protests in Iran are pertinent, it plays a major role in unearthing even the quietest feelings of dissatisfaction and animosity towards Khamenei’s regime. The government’s internet censorship highlights the critical role that social media has played in the Iran demonstrations. The attempt to contain public fury and the dissemination of information online are two examples of how social media has helped the protests endure.

Similar to the major waves of resistance in previous years, the 2022 protests have been highly decentralised, there is no central leader or organisation that drives the resistance against the current regime. Similar to the Black Lives Matter movement in the United States and the United Kingdom when social media circulated videos of the public shooting of George Floyd, social media incentivises individuals in Iran to protest online and organise resistance on the ground.   Iran’s “George Floyd moment” might be summed up by saying that Mahsa Amini’s passing served as both the impetus and fuel for the public’s active forms of resistance to the government. Iran has gotten support from all around the world as a result, much like the BLM movement, which benefited greatly from social media. Iran was thus kicked out of the United Nations (UN) Women’s Rights Council, and the UN also sanctioned Iran’s Morality Police based on allegations of human rights abuses. 

Ultimately, many elements contribute to the Iran protests. Mahsa Amini’s death was the catalyst that started a continuing global movement against Iran’s current regime. Scholars and journalists alike have drawn attention to the role of women’s rights and debates on Islamic law, but social media has been a key component that helps to facilitate the impact of all grievances. Understanding social media’s significance is essential for comprehending the ongoing Iranian demonstrations since it reveals how a decentralised movement has spread throughout the globe. Social media is still a vital tool for winning over other nations’ and international organisations’ support.

Rwanda Plan: breakdown of the judgment

This article will summarise the key facts of the recent High Court ruling on the UK government’s policy of sending unsuccessful asylum seekers to Rwanda, the critiques of the ruling as well as the implications the ruling will have on the future of immigration control and human rights. This article will also explore whether the Rwanda policy is an effective deterrent against small boat crossings and an effective use of the public purse and resources. 

In December 2022, the UK High Court passed an influential and controversial judgment. In the judgment, the Court held that the government’s much criticised policy to send unsuccessful asylum seekers to Rwanda is lawful. The case at the Court involved eight asylum seekers from Iraq, Iran, Syria, Vietnam, Albania and Sudan who argued that their asylum requests should be reviewed in the UK and not in Rwanda, reasoning that their claims would not be sufficiently examined in the country. They also argued that the Home Secretary’s legal analysis, which surmised that the East-Central African country was a “safe country”, was flawed. Asylum seekers highlighted that if sent to Rwanda, they would face maltreatment, which would amount to a human rights violation, and contended that the UK government sharing their data with the Rwandan authorities before their claims had been concluded was unlawful. Other arguments contested the fairness of government procedure, highlighting how it punishes asylum seeking (which is against international law) and discriminates against young male asylum seekers from countries (except Ukraine). The case saw interventions from NGOs, one border force officers’ union as well as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

The Court disagreed with the asylum seekers, finding that the Home Secretary had taken reasonable steps in her analysis to conclude that Rwanda is a “safe country”. The Court also maintained this despite human rights abuses against dissidents and political asylum seekers, as highlighted by the asylum seekers’ legal team. Furthermore, it is permissible for the Home Office to contact Rwandan authorities regarding an asylum application before its conclusion and lawful to share data before an application is settled, if reasoned in the name of public interest. Against the grain of public opinion, the Court found that any indirect discrimination against male asylum seekers of certain nationalities is justified. The judgment also found that the process used for the Rwanda decisions is fair and that there is no need for asylum seekers to have legal representation during the process or legal advice before their screening interview. The Court concluded that the policy does not punish asylum seekers.

Since the UK is party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, has the High Court erred in its ruling that the Rwanda policy does not violate Article 31 (non-penalty for “illegal” entry) and Article 33 (non-refoulement) of the Convention? Arguably, yes. It is baffling that the Court considered credible human rights reports (from Human Rights Watch and the General Human Rights in Rwanda) to be irrelevant to its analysis of Rwanda as a safe country. These reports specifically highlight the treatment of protesting asylum seekers and political dissidents respectively. Sending those fleeing persecution to a country with an unsatisfactory human rights record does little but extend their suffering. Furthermore, the government’s travel advice on Rwanda states that LGBTQIA+ people suffer discrimination and abuse, “including from local authorities”, and that there is a lack of legal protection for LGBTQIA+ people. Enver Solomon (Chief Executive of the Refugee Council) wrote in The Guardian that the policy “takes punishment of fellow human beings to a new level“.

This case shows that the “depressing and distressing” policy is here to stay (unless there is success on the partial appeal at the Court of Appeal). It is also a stark reminder of the state of human rights post-Brexit, as the Home Office does not need to do a thorough examination of the asylum seekers’ claims, since EU law no longer applies to the UK. This fits into the backdrop of a wider regression of human rights which have been upheld by the judiciary when challenged (e.g: the deprivation of citizenship in the Shamima Begum case). Given that the government is considering leaving the European Convention on Human Rights, the precedent set by this case will play a more significant role in future deportations to Rwanda, as asylum seekers will not have the protection of the ECHR to challenge any Home Office decision. 

Until then, the next steps will be the Court of Appeal, with no flights commencing whilst appeals are underway, and continued advocacy by Asylum NGOs and legal teams on an individual case by case basis. The operation and impact of the Rwanda Plan still remains to be seen, however the Australian offshoring model provides the UK with a cautionary tale: it did not intercept the smuggling business model, slow migration numbers nor protect refugees from criminal gangs. It also created the highest rates of mental illness amongst detainees ever recorded.

To those who oppose the Rwanda Plan, the silver lining remains the huge undertaking of an offshoring scheme. The Home Office will need to make “legally defensible decisions in individual cases” to deport anyone, and UK 2021 figures show only 113 asylum seekers were successfully removed. Leading immigration barrister Colin Yeo stresses the history of abandoned Home Office schemes and suggests the plan serves more as a “distraction from the asylum backlog and other issues”. On the other side of the process, Rwanda has only agreed to accept a few hundred asylum seekers per year, which begs the question – with £140 million already banked, could its government be relying on a failure within the chain of command? In any case, Rwanda has no need to overextend its end of the bargain. 

Set against a historical low in successful deportations, the Rwanda Plan reveals more than a hemorrhage of time and public resources, but a UK government with little to offer. Instead of building an accessible asylum system with opportunities for refugee self-reliance, the ‘out of sight’ mentality remains the UK’s preferred option. With maze-like bureaucracy and a huge asylum backlog, is the Home Office even benefitting from further unworkable proposals? And most importantly – is offshoring our problems really a sustainable approach? 

International Day of Education

In light of the International Day of Education (24 January), it is timely to reflect on the recent ban on women attending university, the limitations for girls in secondary schools, and the restriction on women
educators in Afghanistan. UNESCO dedicates its fifth edition of the International Day to all the girls and women in Afghanistan, who have been denied their right to learn, study and teach. Director-General Ms. Audrey Azoulay states,

“The Organization condemns this serious attack on human dignity and on the fundamental right to education. With these persistent threats towards the advancement of education and careers… the future is seemingly bleak. To many, the threat towards education has been imminent, yet many still held hope onto the Taliban’s earlier statements reassuring the public of them upholding human rights obligations”.

After a 20-year war and the collapse of the Western-backed government of President Ashraf Ghani, the Taliban took back power in August of 2021. With many fearing and questioning this ‘new’ regime, the Taliban promised they would abide to various human rights obligations, specifically reassuring that, “our sisters and our men have the same rights,” and that they were “committed to the rights of women” within the context of their interpretation of Islamic mandates”. Abdul Baqi Haqqani, the Minister of Higher Education, also promised, “the people of Afghanistan will continue their higher education in the light of sharia law in safety without being in a mixed male and female
environment”.

However, these were empty promises, as the Taliban first showcased their power by gradually impeding on these rights a month into power. In September 2021, women were only permitted in universities that adhered to gender-segregated classrooms with strict dress code rules, and were
only taught by professors of the same sex or older men. And the threat to education did not stop there: in March 2022, all girls’ secondary schools were shut down, with the students being instructed to stay home till further notice. This restriction was then bolstered by the Minister of Higher Education’s announcement that women’s education would be suspended in December – “no PhD or master’s degree is valuable today. You see that the Mullahs and Taliban that are in power have no PhD, masters or even a high school degree, but they are the greatest of all”.

The Taliban insists that these measures are backed up by their interpretation of Islamic teachings, yet we have seen several leaders from Muslim-majority countries condemn their actions. The Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed their astonishment and regret of the Taliban’s backtracking on their initial statement, compelling them to “reverse this decision, which is astonishing in all Islamic countries” and give “Afghan women their full legitimate rights, foremost of which is the right to education, which contributes to supporting security, stability, development and prosperity for Afghanistan”. Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also urged the end of the ban and expressed their concern and disappointment towards the regime. The UAE representative for the UN declared the Taliban’s actions aimed to erase women and girls from public life, further stating that the ban would “violate fundamental human rights, contravene the teachings of Islam, and must be swiftly
reversed”. The Secretary-General for the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation believes that these bans and restrictions will ruin the government’s already failing credibility, but most importantly deny girls and women access to their fundamental rights.

It is important to remember that before the Taliban’s takeover in 1996, Afghanistan benefitted from an inclusive education system, where women and girls took up 50% of Kabul University’s population (both individually within student and teacher populations), as well as 70% of the country’s
schoolteachers, 50% of civilian government workers, and 40% of doctors. With the enrolment of girls drastically increasing from 100,000 (2000) to over 3.5 million in recent years, many fear these numbers will severely dwindle with the new bans and restrictions.

The Taliban has a history of impeding on human rights. It is pertinent that not only are their actions scrutinised and condemned, but most importantly as a global community that we strive and actively contribute to protecting the rights of these girls and women, many of whom have only endured hardship and strife.

SOAS and 67 other UK Universities strike again in March

Trade unions UCU and UNISON saw their members  taking further strike action from Monday 21st to Friday 25th March 2022. This is the latest move in a long saga as employers refuse reasonable negotiations on pay and working conditions and “force through” pension cuts despite the efforts of 68 UK universities who have already undergone 10 days of strike action between 14th February and 2nd March this year. 

University teaching and support staff have been protesting to tackle five main concerns: cuts to pensions, cuts to pay, precarious employment, pay inequality and unsafe workloads. It is estimated that on average university staff are set to lose 35% of their pension and since pay has dropped by 20% in the last 13 years, staff are essentially working for free one day every week. Additionally, there is a 9% ethnicity pay gap across the sector and a 14.8% gender pay gap. Alongside this, staff have been required to work more and are given unmanageable workloads, an established practice that has only been further compounded by the pandemic. The physical and mental health of staff has been detrimentally impacted with over half showing signs of depression.

SOAS students have an important history in standing alongside workers’ struggles and have played a fundamental role in bringing about effective change in the past. Similarly with recent strikes, students have been consistent and unrelenting in their support, participating in Walkouts, standing alongside the picket lines and attending Teach Outs. Some have even gone to great lengths and occupied management offices and have in-turn been subjected to security violence, intimidation tactics, threats of legal action and denial of basic facilities. Students are willing to put their own welfare at risk because they value the importance of fair and civil leadership, they support the right to fair and equal pay for teaching and support staff alike and recognise the impact that staff working conditions have on their learning. 

SOAS is a university that prides itself on its equality, diversity and inclusivity and through promotion of such values attracts its student customer base. It is therefore utterly disingenuous and hypocritical for it to not only be complicit in maintaining unequal and unliveable work conditions of its staff but to also be actively involved in suppressing them from protesting and voicing their concerns.

To regain the trust and confidence of students and staff at SOAS, students are demanding that management must “do everything in its power to prevent any disruption caused by the employers’ attack on pay and pensions by encouraging employers to re-enter negotiations with the Unions as soon as possible and to voice in UUK to put pressure on USS to implement the UCU proposals, which USS recently said were viable and implementable”.

Finally, as staff and student union members we must remember to always be compassionate and inclusive in our fight for better working and learning conditions. Let us recognise that whilst prioritising the needs of our own union is important, we must also extend ourselves in actively promoting  and supporting  the demands of more exploited staff. Perhaps that is a greater moral use of our strike action – protecting the weakest members of our community.

Photo credit: Sophie Squire for the Socialist Worker

Politics over Hijab in Karnataka: a Precursor to State Elections 2023

This weekly briefing is being published in retrospect due to the CCRJ solidarity with the 2022 University Staff Strike.

The Hindu nationalist movement (popularly known as Hindutva) is known for its conservative position and Hindu supremacist ideology. Since 2014, the Bharatiya Janata Party-led (BJP) government has been the political force translating the ideology into policies and governance. It has once again flared up controversy by pursuing policies that target religious minorities in India. One instance of this is the number of institutions in the state of Karnataka which are witnessing protests predominantly led by upper-caste Hindu students against their Muslim peers wearing hijab in class. 

In January 2022, six female students in the Udupi district were denied access to their college campus for donning the hijab. Since then the state, with a BJP government at the helm, has witnessed similar incidents where students wearing hijabs were not allowed to enter their institution’s premises. In some cases, radical Hindu organizations mobilized Hindu students to protest against their Muslim peers by wearing saffron scarves, claiming that there was no equality in allowing religious clothing in “secular educational” spaces. There are video reports of saffron-clad men heckling women wearing hijab and burqa.

A Muslim girl student filed a writ petition in the Karnataka High Court against institutions claiming that Article 14 and 25 of the Indian Constitution guarantees theirright to practice their religion and should protect them from discrimination. The State Government shutdown  colleges for three days until the High Court announced its decision on the matter, but the High Court has only passed an interim order so far, to prevent students from wearing any religious clothing until the final order is out. This order has established a false equivalence between hijab and saffron scarves: unlike the hijab, worn by only some Muslim women as part of their religious expression, the purpose of saffron scarves has been to intimidate Muslim women. 

Any observer of Indian politics would not find it surprising that a communal issue on religious lines has been instigated in a state with upcoming polls. Karnataka will be due for its Legislative Assembly elections in May 2023 and will be one of the few states where the Prime Minister’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)  will be in direct competition with its principal national opposition, the Indian National Congress (INC). The last elections to the house in 2018 resulted in a hung assembly with BJP winning more seats despite INC winning the popular vote. 

BJP has been known to instigate communal issues in poll-bound states and foster a polarised atmosphere to score electoral points and support. In 2021, civic bodies in Gujarat state, where elections will be taking place in December 2022, announced regulations against the sale of non-vegetarian food in public spaces. The Delhi riots in 2020 and the demonization of Shaheen Bagh protestors (which was led by Muslim women in the Delhi neighbourhood) occuredjust before the Delhi elections in May 2020. A similar attempt was made to demonise farmers’ protests as a Khalistani plot in January 2021 as the year-long movement was led by farmers from Punjab and Haryana, states with significant sikh populations. But the government had to concede as Punjab is due for polls in February 2022. 

It is a recurring strategy and somewhat tired script of Hindu nationalists to target religious minorities and impose hypocritical standards.  Despite empty political declarations to the contrary, the promise of secularism has always been in contradiction to the Hindutva project. Hindu nationalists, led by the BJP, argue that secularism is a tool of appeasement for minorities which is why there has been a systematic attempt at subverting the constitutional promise of equality. 

Prime Minister Modi, a member of the BJP, promised an “inclusive India” after winning his second term in 2019 but his party has continued to engage in communally polarising election strategies across the country. This controversy over hijabs has created tensions and division among students who were previously studying together, disrupted Muslim female students from accessing their educational institutions ahead of their final exams and set a disturbing precedent of religious discrimination. It is imperative that Mr Modi intervenes and reassures his commitment to his promise. 

Image Credit: Anushree Fadnavis/Reuters

Policy Brief Issue 5: December 2021

SECTARIANISM IN PAKISTAN: COUNTERACTING RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM

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